The political concern of the Church towards an authentic political development of man and society has always been expressed by the Church. One of the means of doing this is the teaching Magisterium of the Roman Pontiffs begun with the Encyclical Rerum novarurn of Leo XIII. John Paul II had called for reforms of political institutions in the world in his Sollicitudo rei socialis. The political situation in Africa is one of great concern, characterised by dictatorial military regimes. Even the (...) democratically elected Governments turned out to be corrupt and are be-devilled with bad governance. This work focuses on the pronouncements indicated in the Pastoral Communiques of the Bishops under the aegis of SECAM in imitation of the Roman Pontiffs to advance the Social Teaching of the Church in the era of globalisation. In agreement with the tradition of the Roman Pontiffs and the Social Teaching of the Church, the thesis draws attention to ways of ameliorating the deteriorating political situation in Africa. The Bishops condemned corrupt regimes and offered solutions for a better political future for Africa. This book finally indicates much of the way forward for Africa. (shrink)

This book examines the idea of communalism in African cultures as a dominant philosophical theme that provides the conceptual foundation for African traditional moral thoughts, moral education, values, beliefs, conceptions of reality, practices, ways of life, and the now popular African saying, 'it takes a village to raise a child.' It defends communalism against various criticisms and argues that when properly understood and harnessed, it could provide the necessary foundation for Africa's development.

I argue in a non-reductive sense for a plausible epistemic principle, which can (1) theoretically and instrumentally unify or systematize all fallacies, and (2) provide a justification for using such a principle for characterizing an erroneous argument as a fallacy. This plausible epistemic principle involves the idea of an error in the method of justification, which results in a failure to provide relevant evidence to satisfy certain standards of adequate proof. Thus, all fallacies are systematically disguised failures to provide substantive (...) proof: a failure in the attempt to persuade rationally, as opposed to emotionally or rhetorically. I argue that the epistemic idea of begging the question is essential to this idea of a fallacy as an inadequate proof. (shrink)

In this paper, I take issue with Wiredu’s characterization and criticism of the general problem of epistemic authoritarianism that he identifies in some African cultures. I then defend a plausible view of epistemic authoritarianism as a method of epistemic justification in some African cultures. I argue that both his characterization and criticism implies an affirmation of epistemic individualism and autonomy, doxastic voluntarism, and a denial of epistemic dependence. I argue against epistemic autonomy and individualism, and doxastic voluntarism, because they imply (...) that one is always in the best epistemic position to be the best judge in order to make voluntary decisions regarding what is justifiable. But one person alone cannot have an infinite set of beliefs to determine in every possible situation what would constitute a determinate set of relevant alternatives and evidence in order to rule out any plausible or possible defeater. He would have to epistemically depend on others who may be authorities and ‘epistemically superior.’ Thus, I argue in favor of the dependence on the epistemic superiority and authority of tradition and elders as a basis for epistemic justification in African cultures---which Wiredu characterizes as epistemic authoritarianism. I suggest that there could be two senses of epistemic authoritarianism: the irrational and rational variants. I defend the latter in the context of the evidentialist notion of justification. I rely in part on the arguments of some philosophers who have attempted to provide a social and pragmatic context for the analysis of knowledge. So, my defense is an attempt to consider how social context, which is an important dimension of epistemology, may justify the notion of epistemic dependence on the authority of tradition and elders. This contextual and social analysis of knowledge and justification would lend credence to the sense of epistemic authoritarianism that underlies some African cultures. Although I concede that this plausible idea of authoritarianism may in principle discourage inquiry and questioning, I do not agree that it is as negative as Wiredu suggests. It has validity, when it is considered with respect to the contextual nature of epistemic justification. Moreover, such justification may have a particular resonance with respect to substantive beliefs which have practical relevance in the day-to-day lives of people. (shrink)

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, EarlyView.

Издание предназначено для широкого круга читателей, интересующихся проблемами филологии науки и техники, социальной философии, экологии.

Работа будет интересна преподавателям, аспирантам и студентам гуманитарных специальностей и тем, кто интересуется проблемами становления личности.

I argue that the analytic method has been circularly used to analyze the concept of “philosophy,” and that the result of this analysis has also been used to criticize African ethnophilosophy as nonphilosophical. I critically examine the criticism that ethnophilosophy implies cognitive relativism and the criticism that it implies authoritarianism. I defend ethnophilosophy against these criticisms, arguing that they are rooted in logical positivism, the view that philosophy essentially involves the use of the methods of science and logical analysis. I (...) argue that such analysis and criticisms, given their pedigree, do not provide an adequate or accurate picture of the nature of philosophy. (shrink)

The general notion of the development of productive forces is, according to the materialist understanding of history, the point of departure for the solution of numerous concrete problems in Marxist-Leninist social theory and current revolutionary practice. It offers decisive arguments for the critique of Right and "Left" revisionism and reformism. In the course of the disputes that have recently begun in the Marxist economic and philosophical literature with regard to the basic questions involved in this problem, substantial gaps are found (...) specifically in the development of general theory. What is the internal contradiction moving within the forces of production; in what lies the distinction between their existence and essence, essence and appearance? A correct understanding of the processes involved in the resolution of this contradiction in real life, in revolutionary practice, depends upon attaining the utmost clarity with regard to these questions. (shrink)

I articulate a plausible African view of ‘moral dignity’, which is founded on the normative conception of ‘personhood’ and the idea of communalism. The status of ‘personhood’ is attained when one is recognized for internalizing communal norms, performing requisite duties, and participating in relevant functions. This engenders the appellation of ‘moral dignity’, which implies ‘being worthy of respect’ and consequent respect by others. I examine the implication of the ideas of ‘moral dignity’, ‘personhood’, and ‘communalism’ for a plausible conception and (...) practice of punishment. I argue that the plausible communal goal of punishment is not retributive but reformatory, reconciliatory, rehabilitative, and reintegrative. A person who exhibits bad behaviour, violates rules or norms, and commits crimes diminishes his ‘moral dignity’, ‘personhood’, and creates disharmony in, and is ‘estranged’ from, the community. This involves a denial of ‘personhood’ and ‘moral dignity’, which involves disapprobation and, in some cases, requires punishment. Such a person is thus in need of rehabilitation to improve or restore his ‘moral dignity’ and ‘personhood’. By engaging in redemptive behaviours, one is able to restore the moral dignity or personhood one has lost or diminished so that one can be in harmony and reconciled with the people and community one is estranged from, has harmed or offended. (shrink)

I critically examine how, from a Western cultural perspective of romantic love and Judeo-Christian tradition, certain liberal cultural values and prejudices are used presumptuously to criticize polygamy in African traditions. These criticisms assume, circularly, the superiority of Western cultural monogamous values over African cultural traditional practice of polygamy. I argue that these arguments are specious and particularly unreasonable from an intercultural philosophical perspective. A plausible liberal justification for Western legal imposition of monogamy is to prevent harm. I argue that if (...) polygamy is so harmful as to warrant legal restriction based on the liberal principle of harm, such harm also exists in monogamy. The harm that is falsely associated with polygamy is not the result of polygamy per se but other factors relating to the social-cultural context of the marriage or the character of the individuals in the marriage. (shrink)

The commonplace view of autonomy involves the ability of individuals to be self-governing and self-legislating, and to make freely and reflectively deliberate choices and decisions. This idea of autonomy — that persons are metaphysically free, that is, that they have free will and may use reason to choose how they shall act — is considered to be a defining feature of a responsible person. There is a commonplace view that autonomy is intrinsically good such that overriding it cannot be justified.1 (...) This intrinsic value implies a negative sense of autonomy, which involves non-interference with one’s free choices, as opposed to a positive sense, which involves helping or enabling one to.. (shrink)

I examine the standard view of dignity in Western literature and Metz’s African community view of dignity as a capacity for communal harmonious living. I argue that moral dignity is not just having a capacity for harmonious communal living, but the moral use of such capacity for the promotion of love, friendship, positive identity and active solidarity, which involves normatively prescriptive and evaluative elements. Thus, a plausible African communal conception of moral dignity, which is founded on a moral conception of (...) personhood and community, involves a combination of capacity and agency that is conceptually tied to communal responsibility and respect for self and others. This indicates that human capacities do not have an inherent moral worth. Capacities are instrumentally good and their worth depends on how they are used to promote the moral good of communal well-being, on which individual well-being or dignity depends. This view captures the various use-senses of dignity, addresses many of the problems with many of the analyses of dignity in the literature, and also indicates its relevance. (shrink)

I argue that lying has many dimensions, hence, some putativecases of lying may not match our intuitions or acceptedmeanings of lying. The moral lesson we should teach must be that lying is not a simple principle or feature, buta cluster of features or spectrum of shades, where anythingin the spectrum or cluster is considered lying. I argue thatthe view regarding lying as a single principle or featurehas problematic meta-ethical implications. I do a meta-ethicalanalysis of the meaning of lying, not only (...) to indicatesuch problems, but also the need to teach the act ofrational discussion and meta-ethical analysis. I arguethat the process of meta-ethical analysis and rationaldiscussion should be part of moral education, in that itmay help to develop critical thought about the abilityand practice of making good and rational moral judgments. (shrink)

I articulate an African view of personhood that combines beauty and goodness–aesthetic and moral features. I discuss the idea of communalism, which provides the social and moral values and belief system that give meaning to this view of personhood. I use ideas from some African ethnic traditions, or some people’s account of these traditions, as examples to illustrate this view. The similarities in these examples from different ethnic traditions indicate that it is reasonable to characterize this view as a common (...) theme that may plausibly represent many African cultures. This essay does not seek to provide an anthropological descriptive view, but a plausible philosophical stance on how we ought to understand the idea of personhood in African cultures. I do not suggest that all African cultures or traditions have exactly the same view or that they hold this view in the same way, extent or degree. Obviously, there may be minor differences that do not alter the essence of the view. Many of the authors quoted in this paper who have written on African philosophy use the phrase, ‘African culture’, ‘African tradition’, ‘African view’ or ‘African society’. Thus, it has become commonplace in African philosophical circles that when the prefix ‘African’ is used in the literature on African philosophy, it does not imply that Africa is a monolith or that its traditions are static. There is a recognition that some traditions have changed or are changing. The use of ‘African tradition’ usually indicates a generalizing theoretical abstraction about some enduring and dominant similar themes or ideas in many African traditions. It is also meant to contrast ‘African’ with ‘Western’ traditions, and to also respond to Western critiques of Africa as a group. It is used in a similar way in which the prefix ‘Western’ is used in the literature. This notion of ‘Western’, which is replete in the literature, does not suggest the West is a monolith, but rather, a reference to some similar dominant themes in Western thought. (shrink)

Many people are talking about being in a post-racial era, which implies that we have overcome race and racism. Their argument is based on the fact that manyof the virulent manifestations of racism are not prevalent today. I argue that racism is not seen as prevalent today because the commonplace views of racism fail to capture the more subtle and insidious new forms of racism. I critically examine some of these views and indicate that racism, its forms and manifestations have (...) changed over time. As such, racism may not be manifested in the standard obvious negative behaviors that people know and expect, but instead, it is manifested in even positive behaviors that the commonplace views may not identify as racism. I offer a view of racism that captures the new subtle forms of racism today, which are not as harmful and invidious as the older forms. Simply because the new forms of racism are not as obvious or harmful, this does not mean that racism no longer exists. (shrink)

I argue that the metaphysical capacity of autonomy is not intrinsically valuable; it is valuable only when used in relation to a community's values and instrumentally for making the proper choices that will promote one's own and the community's well-being. I use the example of the choice to take one's life by suicide to illuminate this view. I articulate a plausible African conception of personhood as a basis for the idea of relational autonomy. I argue that this conception is better (...) understood as a social-moral thesis, and not a metaphysical thesis. A metaphysical thesis gives an account of the abstract nature of an atomic individual, his agency, and rational choice. The social-moral thesis indicates that personhood and autonomy are positive and relational to the life plans, well-being, material conditions, and the best means for achieving them that are made available and possible by harmonious living in a community. This idea of autonomy is not just having the capacity of freewill; it also involves how such freewill is used, in terms of how an individual's choices are guided by internalized communal values. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Menkiti's Moral Man by Oritsegbubemi Anthony OyowePolycarp IkuenobeOYOWE, Oritsegbubemi Anthony. Menkiti's Moral Man. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2022. xii + 221 pp. Cloth, $100.00Oyowe critically examines the various threads in, issues raised by, and implications of Menkiti's maximal conception of personhood, against the backdrop of various criticisms, including his own. He indicates that, as "a repentant critic," he does "not deny the merits of these criticisms," but he (...) is "convinced that there are resources in Menkiti's general account for tackling them."In chapter 1, Oyowe examines how Menkiti uses the idea of community to foreground his normative view of personhood, in order to illuminate the African idea that one is a person because of, and through relationships with, other persons in a community. This indicates that one's existence or [End Page 356] identity has necessary external elements of cultural belonging, in addition to internal intrinsic elements. These cultural elements require ontological progression that involves a process of social-moral incorporation into communal practices and norms. Oyowe argues that while this conception is plausible, it raises questions regarding oppressive cultures and their effects on individuals. He indicates that the kind of person that emerges from this conception is a "soft" social entity.Chapter 2 examines the issue of the nature of the relationship between persons (as soft social entities) and community, and the implications for individual autonomy, practical reasoning, and moral agency. Oyowe argues that the pertinent issue is not whether the individual should have moral or ontological priority over the community or vice versa, but the aspect of individuality that is conducive to what we cherish about the community. This is because Menkiti presupposes that in order to be a maximal person, one must have intrinsic capacities for moral agency to take on communal functions and duties. But the community creates the conditions for individuals to express individuality and autonomy, engage in practical reasoning, and make the choice to conform with communal norms in order to be recognized as persons.So, the maximal conception of personhood raises issues about the nature of entities that deserve a moral status. Chapter 3 examines the moral status of infants, people with cognitive impairment, the senile, nonhuman animals, and the moral duties that people have toward these entities. If we understand personhood as failing to extend moral status to these entities, such a view might be charged with speciesism and anthropocentrism. Oyowe argues that a plausible interpretation of personhood, in the context of the communal priority of duties, suggests that people have certain responsibilities toward human and nonhuman nonpersons. This interpretation is grounded in Menkiti's distinction between "deserving justice"—which is not based on having certain intrinsic properties, moral capacities, or cognitive abilities—and "being a person." Because Menkiti insists that persons ought to be able to use their capacities to perform requisite communal duties, personhood must involve an obligation to consider the interests of nonpersons and a community of respect for those who deserve justice.Chapter 4 examines the dilemma created by the social architecture of a community's cultural traditions, institutions, expectations, norms, and practices that are necessary for personhood and social identity. While such architecture is capable of supporting the achievement of personhood, it could also be restrictive. He uses Chinua Achebe's novel, Things Fall Apart, to illuminate how the structures for recognizing persons that are oppressive of and biased against women could be disguised. Although Menkiti does not address this issue, his conception of personhood highlights the problem of social justice for women because relevant social architecture may exclude women from equal and full communal recognition and participation. An appreciation of this problem [End Page 357] introduces an alternative way of understanding social justice in terms of communal recognition or lack thereof.In chapter 5, Oyowe uses the intuitions underlying Locke's distinction between "person" and "human being" to illuminate Menkiti's account of personhood. Person and human being are not identical because they have different persistent conditions. Persons persist by virtue of mental capacities and practical relevance that are developed after one is identified as a human organism. This raises the issues of (a) whether being a... (shrink)

This paper analyzes colonialism in Africa to show a plausible connection between culture and human agency and to highlight the conceptual problem of ascribing responsibility in the context of the notion of culturally induced moral ignorance. It argues for the plausibility of the inability thesis, which states that people can be rendered morally ignorant by their culture, using as a backdrop, Moody-Adams’ account of the connection between culture and agency. It shows that Moody-Adams’ account, and her criteria for ascribing responsibility, (...) cannot handle the problem identified with the colonial situation or culture in Africa, with respect to responsibility of corrupt African leaders. Her arguments do not fully appreciate the real force of the inability thesis and the substantial problem of delimiting the scope of responsibility, which is involved in ascribing responsibility in the context of cultural impediments. This paper does not draw any specific practical conclusion with respect to the responsibility of African leaders. It leaves such a practical conclusion open. However, given the analysis of the colonial situation, the nature and complexity of the problem, it suggests that it is conceptually problematic to blame entirely, without qualification, the specter of corruption in Africa on African leaders. (shrink)

I argue for a plausible view of the African idea and practice of substantive individual rights. This view indicates that rights are a means of enhancing individual dignity in the context of a communal system of correlativity of duties and rights. This view is exemplified in Menkiti’s idea of the priority of duties. I explicate this idea and indicate how it highlights the inherent social-communal nature of humans that is implicated in African normative conception of “personhood”.

We report on the experience of creating a socially networked system, the Research-oriented Social Environment , for representing knowledge in the form of relationships between people, documents, and groups. Developed as an intercampus, interdisciplinary project of the University of California, this work reflects on a collaboration between scholars in the humanities, software engineering, and information studies by providing an opportunity not only to synthesize different disciplinary perspectives, but also to interrogate and challenge the assumptions each brings to team-based design projects (...) in the digital humanities. This work examines socially networked knowledge as both content and methodology for collaboration, calling for further critique and future investigation of epistemological questions in models of social networks. (shrink)

I examine the plausibility that culture may induce moral ignorance to mitigate or vitiate blameworthiness. I show how culturally induced moral ignorance may explain and provide an excuse, but not a justification for, terrorist acts, and how a recognition of their moral ignorance and the basis for it, may indicate the proper moral response to extremist Islamic terrorism. I argue that Moody-Adams' criticisms of culturally induced moral ignorance fail to consider how the brainwashing processes, false beliefs, and the closed nature (...) of oppressive cultures may vitiate an epistemic requirement for blameworthiness. I argue that we cannot assume, as Moody-Adams did, that because relevant moral facts are out there, and because people are rationally capable of knowing those facts and reflecting on their cultural principles as the basis for their actions, when they act immorally, it is because they simply refused to know the relevant moral facts or chose not reflect on their cultural principles. (shrink)

This essay provides an exposition and a plausible interpretation of Ifeanyi Menkiti’s conception of personhood vis-a-vis this community. I do this, partly, to rebut some specific criticisms by Kwame Gyekye and Bernard Matolino. They construe Menkiti’s account, primarily, as a metaphysical thesis about the community that provides the essential ontological basis for the nature of personhood. They argue that this view of communitarianism is radical or extreme because the community diminishes individuality and prioritizes community’s interests over individuals’ interests, freedom, and (...) rights. I argue that Gyekye’s and Matolino’s interpretations of Menkiti’s view are mistaken, and that Menkiti’s account of the connection between the community and personhood is a social-moral thesis. This thesis argues that the community provides the norms and material conditions for individuals to live a meaningful life and achieve personhood, and achieving personhood involves being integrated into, and contributing positively to the harmony of, the community. Keywords: Menkiti, Gyekye, Matolino, Personhood, Community, Moderate Communitarianism, Radical Communitarianism. (shrink)

The universalists argue that there is currently no African philosophy. Compared to Western philosophy, African philosophy does not have the requisite features of a writing tradition and a rigorous and critical analytical approach to debates over universal conceptual issues, engaged in by individuals. This stance, it is argued here, involves a parochial conception of 'philosophy' that is applied to African philosophy and captures only the contemporary analytic tradition of Western philosophy--while the ancient and medieval periods indicate that other speculative, constructive, (...) and normative approaches to philosophy exist that are not captured by this conception. Moreover, African philosophy that is equivalent to the ancient and medieval periods does exist, and this African equivalent is a precursor to the contemporary analytic philosophy that the universalists are looking for in Africa. (shrink)

This paper explores the nature of the relationship between reasonable variations in moral justifications and universal moral principles. It examines Wiredu’s distinction between custom and morality, and its implications for the issue of moral justification in African cultures. It argues that Wiredu’s distinction does not adequately articulate how universal moral principles are employed in different circumstances to justify actions and judgments. Wiredu’s distinction implies that a conceptual account of moral justification does not involve custom regarding relative facts and cultural norms. (...) The paper defends a variant of the relativism about moral justification that does imply relativism of truth and incommensurability between two culturally relative moral perspectives. It argues that the plausibility of such relativism is contingent on the possibility of conceptual, cognitive, and epistemic universals, and the idea that moral reasoning is a kind of practical reasoning that does not necessarily depend on intellectual rationality. (shrink)

This article examines two issues raised and addressed by Oyowe in his book, Menkiti’s Moral Man. The first involves two of Oyowe’s criticisms of Menkiti: One criticism is that his conception of personhood is unfairly gendered; the other is that Menkiti’s view involves the priority of the community over individuals. The second issue involves Oyowe’s criticisms of Ikuenobe’s analysis of some aspects of Menkiti’s view in the context of the above criticisms. Oyowe indicates that, although he is “a repentant critic” (...) of Menkiti, he does “not deny the merits of these criticisms.” On page 15, He indicates that he is “convinced that there are resources in Menkiti’s general account for tackling them [criticisms].” This article highlights how his criticisms of Ikuenobe indicate his failure to appreciate fully the relevant robust resources in Menkiti for addressing these criticisms that Ikuenobe’s analysis highlights. (shrink)

I critically examine the eliminativist theories of race or racism, and the behavioral theory of racism, which provide the theoretical foundation, respectively, for the nominalist and substantive conceptualizations of the idea of a post-racial era. The eliminativist theories seek to eliminate the concepts of “race” or “racism” from our discourse. Such elimination indicates a nominalist sense of the idea of a post-racial era. The behavioral theory of racism argues that racism must be manifested in obviously harmful actions. And because such (...) harmful actions are not prevalent today, this implies that we are in a post-racial era in a substantive sense. I conceptualize some subtle forms of racism that are prevalent today, which cannot be captured by the behavioral theory, but can best be captured by doxastic theories of racism. I conceptualize a substantive idea of a post-racial era, and then argue based on such conceptualization, that we are not in a post-racial era because subtle forms of racism are still prevalent today. (shrink)